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Several ﬁrms preannounce their price increases with the expectation that such announcements
will be evaluated favorably by investors. However, little is known about the actual effect they
have on shareholder value. Accordingly, the authors present the ﬁrst systematic empirical ex-
amination of investors' evaluations of 274 price-increase preannouncements (PIPs). Results
show that whereas the average increase in abnormal returns following a PIP is 0.51%, almost
41% of the PIPs result in negative abnormal returns. To explore this heterogeneity, the authors
propose a conceptual framework that focuses on three key pieces of information that investors
can use when evaluating a PIP: information on the nature (time to implementation and mag-
nitude) of the preannounced price increase, the stated attribution for the preannounced price
increase (demand and/or cost based), and information on prior PIP occurrences by the ﬁrm
and its competitors. Results indicate that PIPs with greater time to implementation, higher
own precedence and greater competitive precedence result in lower abnormal returns, while
PIPs with higher magnitude and PIPs with an explicit demand attribution result in greater
abnormal returns.
© 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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Price increases are widely viewed as one of the most effective marketing instruments to increase proﬁts (Meehan, Davenport, &
Kahlon, 2012). Consulting and popular-press reports as well as industry experts frequently underscore the importance of price in-
creases. For example, Deloitte Consulting reports that the effect of a price increase on proﬁts is 4 times that of other initiatives
(Hayes & Singh, 2013). McKinsey & Company reports that a 1% increase in product price can boost the operating proﬁts of a typical
Global 1200 ﬁrm by 8.70% (Baker, Marn, & Zawada, 2010). The investment community also endorses the importance of price
increases. Warren Buffet, for example, suggests that the ability to raise prices is investors' “single most important decision in
evaluating a business” (see Frye & Campbell, 2011, p. 1 for the full statement). Similarly, Reuters identiﬁes a ﬁrm's ability to
raise prices as the key concern for investors in 2017 (Subhedar & Rees, 2017).
Against this background, it is not surprising that several ﬁrms publicly announce their price increases ahead of their actual
implementation to signal to investors their ability and willingness to do so (Calantone & Schatzel, 2000). For example, during
2010–2014, Starbucks made 10 price-increase preannouncements (PIPs), J.M. Smucker made 7 PIPs, while Peet's Coffee made
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just one such preannouncement. Analysts tend to view a PIP as a valuable signal as it communicates potential future earnings to
investors, and allows customers to make budgetary adjustments (Marn, Roegner, & Zawada, 2004; Smith, 2011). A PIP can also act
as an important competitive signal that may well inﬂuence competitors' subsequent pricing decisions (Heil & Langvardt, 1994;
Prabhu & Stewart, 2001).
Anecdotal evidence, however, shows that investors do not always share a unanimous positive view about PIPs. For example,
when J.M. Smucker preannounced a price increase 9 days before its implementation in February 2011 (J.M. Smucker Company,
2011), it resulted in an abnormal increase of 0.76% in its stock price.1 However, when it preannounced another price increase al-
most 2 months before its implementation in September 2011 (Ziobro, 2011), its stock price had an abnormal decrease of 0.40%.
Similarly, when Starbucks made a preannouncement of a 1% increase in its prices in June 2013 (Kavilanz, 2013), it resulted in
an abnormal decrease of 0.72% in its stock price. This decrease stands in stark contrast to the 4.5% price increase that was
preannounced in June 2014 (Ausick, 2014), where its stock price experienced an abnormal increase of 1.85%.
Given the oft-mentioned importance, combined with the contradictory anecdotal evidence, it is surprising that there is no sys-
tematic examination of investors' evaluations of a PIP. Accordingly, we draw on multiple secondary data sources to present the
ﬁrst large-scale empirical study of investors' evaluations of PIPs. Using an event-study approach, we measure investors' evaluations
by calculating the abnormal returns following 274 PIPs between 2010 and 2014. We ﬁnd that, on average, a PIP results in abnor-
mal returns of 0.51%. There is, however, signiﬁcant underlying heterogeneity, as almost 41% of the PIPs result in negative abnormal
returns. Therefore, we develop a conceptual framework to identify conditions under which investors will react more or less
positively (negatively) to a PIP. In doing so, we respond to recent calls for more research to examine investors' evaluations of a
ﬁrm's pricing decisions (Edeling & Fischer, 2016, p. 533), and complement existing studies on price increases that almost
exclusively examine customer reactions (Homburg, Hoyer, & Koschate, 2005; Homburg, Koschate, & Totzek, 2010).
Following the announcement of an upcoming price increase, investors may decide to buy or sell stock, a decision that depends
on the performance (cash-ﬂow) implications they expect that this increase will entail and, relatedly, on the reasons they think the
ﬁrm may have to not only increase its prices, but to also preannounce that increase. These performance implications, in turn, are
likely to be a function of the reactions of both customers and competitors. Indeed, customers may remain loyal to the brand (in
which case a higher per-unit margin on a comparable sales volume could be obtained), or switch to cheaper alternatives (in
which case the total revenues may even decrease). Similarly, competitors may either mimic the increase, which would mitigate
any market-share losses, or maintain (and even decrease) their own price to improve their competitive position. Relatedly, the
ﬁrm may raise its prices because of higher demand and a strong belief that its customers will stick with the brand despite the
higher prices (which could be labelled a demand-dominant motivation). Alternatively, the ﬁrm could preannounce the price in-
crease because it expects its competitors to follow, which would cause the average price (and proﬁt margin) in the industry to
increase (a setting that could be labelled competitor driven), or it may explicitly communicate that its costs are/have been rising,
in which case the price increase is meant to pass on some of this cost increase to its consumers (a cost-based scenario). Or maybe
the ﬁrm is just unsure about the price sensitivity of its customer base and uses the preannouncement as a price sensitivity probing
mechanism.
Unfortunately, neither the customer and competitive reactions nor the underlying reasons for the price increase are known to
investors at the time of the preannouncement. Because of that, investors have to infer these latent variables from information that
is available and observed at that time. We postulate that investors are likely to draw such inferences from three key drivers of a
PIP. First, we posit that investors will take information on the implementation of the preannounced price change into account,
i.e., when it will become effective and the extent of the increase (i.e., implementation information). Second, investors can consider
whether an explicit reason for the increase is offered in the announcement (i.e., attribution), and if so, whether the price change is
attributed to an increase in demand and/or to an increase in the underlying costs. Finally, investors' evaluations of a PIP are likely
to also be affected by prior PIP occurrences by the ﬁrm and/or its competitors (i.e., precedence).
Results provide strong support for the conceptual framework. Consistent with our emphasis on implementation information,
we ﬁnd that time to implementation has a signiﬁcant negative impact on abnormal returns. In contrast, magnitude has a signiﬁ-
cant positive impact. Underscoring the importance of attribution, we ﬁnd that a PIP is likely to result in a signiﬁcant positive effect
on abnormal returns if a ﬁrm provides a demand attribution. Results also support expectations about PIP precedence by both the
focal ﬁrm and its competitors. Speciﬁcally, higher PIP precedence by the ﬁrm has a signiﬁcant negative effect on abnormal returns.
In addition, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative effect of competitive precedence on abnormal returns following a PIP. Taken together,
the results present a nuanced picture that enables senior managers to identify conditions under which PIPs are more likely to
be evaluated (un)favorably by investors.
1. Conceptual framework
Price changes are an important facet of a ﬁrms' marketing strategy. Firms can decide to increase or decrease their prices in re-
sponse to changing circumstances ranging from adjustments in consumer demand and competitive imperatives (Prabhu &
Stewart, 2001) to factors affecting its operations such as input prices (Homburg et al., 2005). Interestingly, while publicly-listed
ﬁrms frequently make PIPs, they very rarely (if ever) announce upcoming price decreases.2 As such, we focus on the former.
1 An abnormal increase in stock price is an increase in the stock price that is not predicted by taking into consideration fundamental ﬁnancial factors.
2 In fact, a careful search of pricing related announcements by publicly-listed ﬁrms in the calendar year 2014 did not yield a single price decrease announcement.
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A PIP takes place when a ﬁrm makes a public announcement of a future price increase. The fundamental concern for investors
is the expected effect of a PIP on the future cash ﬂows of the ﬁrm (Srinivasan & Bharadwaj, 2004). If investors consider a PIP to
result in an increase (decrease) in future cash ﬂows, they are likely to adjust the stock price of the ﬁrm upwards (downwards),
resulting in positive (negative) abnormal returns.
Drawing on prior literature on preannouncements, we propose (as shown in Fig. 1) that investors' evaluations of a PIP are
likely to be a function of three observable pieces of information: (1) the information contained in the PIP that characterizes the
planned price increase (Implementation Information), (2) the underlying rationale for the PIP (Attribution), and (3) the prior PIP
behaviour of the ﬁrm and its competitors (Precedence).
While a PIP can serve as a “necessary means” for a ﬁrm to communicate its future price level to customers (Smith, 2011,
p. 283), it can also signal to investors the potential future earnings of the ﬁrm (Marn et al., 2004). Moreover, a PIP can also be
conceived as a competitive market signal (Heil & Langvardt, 1994), where the ﬁrm makes a PIP with the purpose of inﬂuencing
the behaviour of its competitors (Prabhu & Stewart, 2001). When developing our expectations, we assess the impact of each of
the proposed drivers on abnormal returns by considering three perspectives: a customer, an economic and a competitive perspec-
tive. In doing so, we draw upon the shareholder value framework of Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey (1998), and consider how
future cash ﬂows could be affected in terms of their level, stability, and timing.3 Then, following prior research (e.g., Geyskens,
Gielens, & Dekimpe, 2002), we derive expectations on the likely net effect on shareholder value by combining the arguments
across the three perspectives.
From a customer's point of view, a PIP's impact on shareholder value is likely to depend on the likelihood and severity of any
customer backlash following a PIP. Customers might react negatively to the PIP by reducing (or even terminating) their relation-
ships with the ﬁrm resulting in lower levels of future cash ﬂows. Customers may even vent their negative emotions by spreading
unfavourable word-of-mouth about the ﬁrm or brand leading to an adverse effect on the purchase decisions of both current and
potential customers (Luo, 2007). This, in turn, is likely to lower the stability of expected future cash ﬂows. Negative word-of-
mouth can also have an adverse effect on the timing of expected future cash ﬂows, as it can make it more difﬁcult (and time con-
suming) to convince prospective new customers (Luo & Homburg, 2007). Drawing on the consumer behaviour literature, we argue
that customers' perceived price unfairness (e.g., Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004), their perceptions of the quality of the ﬁrm's offerings
(e.g., Rao, 2005), and their costs of switching away from the ﬁrm (e.g., Burnham, Frels, & Mahajan, 2003) are likely to inform in-
vestors of the probability and size of a potential customer backlash following a PIP.
From an economic perspective, investors are likely to take into account the PIP's implications in terms of revenues and costs
(Geyskens et al., 2002). While both revenues and costs have a direct impact on the levels of the expected future cash ﬂows of the
ﬁrm (Srinivasan, Pauwels, Silva-Risso, & Hanssens, 2009), the time at which the ﬁrm experiences the changes in revenues and
costs, i.e., sooner or later, will accelerate or delay the ﬁrm's receipt of these expected future cash ﬂows (Srivastava et al., 1998).
Implementation Information
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 Number of Firms Industry Turblence
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Conceptual Model
Fig. 1. Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement; ROA = Return on Assets; COGS = Cost of Goods Sold.
3 Srivastava et al. (1998) also identify the residual value as a fourth dimension of shareholder value. However, given that investors evaluate the net impact of a PIP on
all expected future cash ﬂows, the residual value of the ﬁrm's business is automatically incorporated into the valuation as an outcome of the level, stability and timing of
expected future cash ﬂows (see Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1999, p. 173). Thus, consistent with existing research (e.g., Luo & Homburg, 2008), we do not explicitly
consider the effect of a PIP on the residual value of the ﬁrm's business in our conceptualization.
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Finally, a PIP's impact on shareholder value is also likely to be a function of the degree to which a ﬁrm is vulnerable to com-
petition. Following a PIP, competitors can try to attract the ﬁrm's customers by keeping their own prices unchanged, by cutting
their prices, or by increasing their prices to a lesser extent (Thomadsen, 2012). The higher the expected loss of current and poten-
tial customers to competitors, the lower investors' expectations will be about the level and stability of future cash ﬂows, while the
expected speed of reaction will affect the timing of these cash ﬂows.
It is important to note that our objective is to develop expectations about the impact of a PIP on shareholder value at the time
when the PIP is made. Thus, we formulate arguments for the effect of a PIP on the three aforementioned dimensions of expected
future cash ﬂows to arrive at a testable expectation about the combined (or net) effect on shareholder value. Consistent with prior
event studies (e.g., Geyskens et al., 2002), we do not empirically test the effects of the independent variables on each separate
underlying dimension. Table 1 outlines the three perspectives, along with the net expected effects on the resulting abnormal
returns.
1.1. Implementation information
In assessing the impact of a PIP, investors are likely to focus on two fundamental attributes of the preannounced price increase,
the time to its implementation and its magnitude. This is because time to implementation provides concrete information about the
time at which the expected changes in future cash ﬂows will accrue to the ﬁrm. It also signals the ﬁrm's commitment to imple-
ment the preannounced price increase (cf. Sorescu, Shankar, & Kushwaha, 2007), as well as the concreteness of its intentions. On
the other hand, magnitude communicates the per-unit impact of the preannounced price increase, and thereby helps investors to
form expectations about its likely cash-ﬂow impact (Marn et al., 2004).
1.1.1. Time to implementation
The duration between the date of the PIP and the date at which it becomes effective is the PIP's time to implementation.
Greater time to implementation implies that customers have more time to forward buy (and bring in the associated cash ﬂows
earlier. However, this situation also implies that customers incur lower cost of switching away from the ﬁrm as they have more
time to search and are hence more likely to evaluate (and try) alternatives (Ratchford, 2009). Thus, the customer perspective is
inconclusive on the net impact of time to implementation on expected future cash ﬂows.
From both the economic and competitive perspective, time to implementation is likely to have a negative impact on the
expected future cash ﬂows. This is because if the preannounced price increase corresponds to a better (more proﬁtable) price
for the ﬁrm, then purchases made between the day of the PIP and its effective date will be less proﬁtable for the ﬁrm. More im-
portantly, when a ﬁrm preannounces a price increase far ahead in time, it becomes more vulnerable to competitors' actions as they
have more time to ﬁne tune their strategies to attract the ﬁrm's customers (Kohli, 1999).
Taken together, we argue that concerns from an economic and competitive perspective will outweigh the customer consider-
ations, and result in investors having an overall negative evaluation of PIPs with greater (as compared to lower) time to imple-
mentation. Therefore, we expect greater time to implementation of the preannounced price increase to result in lower
associated abnormal returns.
1.1.2. Magnitude
Magnitude refers to the level of the price increase that is preannounced. A PIP with higher magnitude might be viewed as a
signal of the ﬁrms' conﬁdence in the quality of its offerings (Rao, 2005). However, such PIPs have a greater likelihood of exceeding
customers' price threshold and engage their price sensitivity (Pauwels, Srinivasan, & Franses, 2007). Relatedly, customers also have
a greater incentive to search for and evaluate competing offerings (Burnham et al., 2003). As such, the switching costs for
customers are likely to become lower following PIPs with higher magnitude. Thus, from a customer perspective, such PIPs are
likely to result in a negative impact on expected future cash ﬂows.
From an economic perspective, PIPs of higher magnitude can have a positive effect on expected future cash ﬂows. This is be-
cause such PIPs not only correspond to higher revenues per unit sold, they also provide customers with a greater incentive to
Table 1
Expected effect of key drivers on investors' evaluations of a PIP.
Customer Economic Competitive Expected net effect on investors' evaluations of a PIP
Implementation information
Time to implementation +/− − − −
Magnitude − + +/− ?
Attribution
Demand attribution +/− + + +
Cost attribution + − − −
Precedence
Own precedence − − − −
Competitive precedence + − − −
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement. Consistent with Geyskens et al. (2002), a “+” signiﬁes that we expect the variable in question to have a favourable
effect on the ﬁrm's expected future cash ﬂows (and hence investors' evaluations of the PIP), a “−” signiﬁes a negative effect, a “+/−” signiﬁes that there are good
arguments for both a positive and a negative effect, and a “?” signiﬁes that we do not advance any a priori expectations on the net effect.
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move their purchases forward to take advantage of the current (lower) price (Bijmolt, van Heerde, & Pieters, 2005). Price increases
of higher magnitude also signal the presence of a “core loyal customer base with a strong need or desire” for the ﬁrm's offerings
such that they will continue to purchase from the ﬁrm “even at very high prices” (Pauwels et al., 2007, p. 85). Such loyal cus-
tomers, in turn, suggest that PIPs with higher magnitude are likely to result in a higher expected future cash ﬂows from a com-
petitive perspective. However, if competitors do not follow this increase, a ﬁrm's relative price position will deteriorate more,
hence making it more vulnerable to competition. This is likely to have a negative impact on investors' expectations of its future
cash ﬂows. Thus, from a competitive perspective, the net impact of magnitude on expected future cash ﬂows is unclear.
Given that the customer (negative), economic (positive), and competitive (positive or negative) perspectives provide good ar-
guments for both a positive and a negative effect, we examine the impact of the magnitude of the preannounced price increase on
the associated abnormal returns in an exploratory fashion.
1.2. Attribution
The reason(s) provided by a ﬁrm for raising the price charged to customers is referred to as the PIP's attribution. Since a price
increase can only result in an overall increase in future cash ﬂows if it is not offset by a proportionate decrease in the quantity
sold, the cash-ﬂow implications of a preannounced price increase due to rising demand are likely to be different from those of ris-
ing costs (Prabhu & Stewart, 2001). Thus, investors are likely to evaluate a preannounced price increase differently depending on
whether the ﬁrm attributes it to rising demand, i.e., a Demand Attribution, or to rising costs, i.e., a Cost Attribution.
1.2.1. Demand attribution
A ﬁrm provides a demand attribution in its PIP if it states that the reason for its preannounced price increase is an increase in
the demand for its offerings. A preannounced price increase is likely to be perceived as unfair if it is attributed to rising demand
(Kwak, Puzakova, & Rocereto, 2015). This is because customers are likely to infer that the ﬁrm will enjoy additional proﬁts while
making them bear the burden of higher prices (Campbell, 1999). However, rising demand also suggests that there is greater adop-
tion of the ﬁrm's offerings, thus signalling to customers that the ﬁrm is offering high-quality products and/or services that provide
unique beneﬁts (Hellofs & Jacobson, 1999). Therefore, from a customer's perspective, it is unclear if a PIP citing demand attribution
is likely to increase or reduce expected future cash ﬂows. However, from an economic perspective, citing a demand attribution in a
PIP is likely to have a positive impact on the expected future cash ﬂows. This is because higher demand indicates that the per-unit
impact of the preannounced price increase will apply to a high(er) number of units sold.
Given that rising demand also signals to investors the ﬁrm's ability to increase its customer base, investors are likely to be more
conﬁdent about the ﬁrm's value proposition, and hence less likely to be concerned about competitors' ability to attract its cus-
tomers (e.g., Prabhu & Stewart, 2001). Importantly, customers of ﬁrms with rising demand are also likely to be more loyal as
they tend to have more positive attitudes toward the ﬁrm's offerings (Koschate-Fischer, Cramer, & Hoyer, 2014). As such, from
a competitive perspective, PIPs with a demand attribution are likely to have a positive impact on expected future cash ﬂows.
In summary, a joint consideration of the customer, economic, and competitive perspectives suggest that investors have more
reasons to expect a PIP with a demand attribution to result in higher associated abnormal returns.
1.2.2. Cost attribution
A ﬁrm provides a cost attribution in a PIP if it states that the reason for the preannounced price increase is an increase in its
cost of doing business. Customers are less likely to perceive a preannounced price increase as unfair if it is due to an increase in
ﬁrm costs (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003). This is because customers view such price increases as an attempt by the ﬁrm to main-
tain (rather than increase) its existing level of proﬁt (Campbell, 1999). As such, from a customer perspective, a cost attribution in a
PIP is likely to have a positive impact on the expected future cash ﬂows.
From an economic perspective, however, a cost attribution in a PIP indicates that rising costs are likely to (partially or fully)
offset any beneﬁts of higher revenues due to the price increase. Rising costs also indicate that the ﬁrm is likely to be more resource
constrained, and thus more vulnerable to competition (Lee & Grewal, 2004). This is because a ﬁrm facing rising costs is likely to be
handicapped by the resulting budget constraints when facing competitors. Thus, from a competitive perspective, PIPs citing cost
attribution are likely to result in a negative impact on expected future cash ﬂows.
In summary, even though it is less probable for customers to perceive a PIP with a cost attribution to be unfair, economic and
competitive considerations suggest that a PIP with a cost attribution is likely to lower investors' expectations about the future cash
ﬂows. Hence, we expect PIPs that provide a cost attribution to result in lower associated abnormal returns.
1.3. Precedence
Precedence refers to the prior preannouncement behaviours of the ﬁrm and its competitors. Recent research ﬁnds that inves-
tors rely on the historical preannouncement behaviour of the ﬁrm and its competitors as an important information source to form
an understanding of the ﬁrm's unobservable pricing strategies (Warren & Sorescu, 2017). Accordingly, we examine both the ﬁrm's
own precedence of PIPs, and that of its competitors.
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1.3.1. Own precedence
A ﬁrm's own precedence of prior PIPs refers to the number of PIPs made by the ﬁrm before the current PIP. Customers are likely
to perceive PIPs with higher own precedence as unfair. This is because customers' perceptions of price unfairness are based on their
comparisons between the price they currently pay and a range of past prices that they have paid (Bolton et al., 2003; Kalyanaram &
Winer, 1995). The more frequent the PIPs by a ﬁrm, the more salient the price attribute becomes (Nijs, Dekimpe, Steenkamps, &
Hanssens, 2001), and the more likely customers will notice that the preannounced new price exceeds previously-paid prices
(Rajendran & Tellis, 1994). The increased salience is also likely to inﬂuence the future price expectations for the ﬁrm's current
and future customers, resulting in a higher price sensitivity and lower willingness to pay (DelVecchio, Shanker Krishnan, & Smith,
2007). Thus, from a customer's perspective, such PIPs are likely to result in a negative impact on expected future cash ﬂows.
From an economic perspective, a ﬁrm incurs a menu cost, i.e., the cost of revising prices (Anderson, Jaimovich, & Simester,
2015), when it makes a PIP. PIPs with higher own precedence are likely to result in higher menu costs and therefore lower
per-unit proﬁts for the ﬁrm. As such, from an economic perspective, such PIPs are likely to have a negative impact on the expected
future cash ﬂows for the ﬁrm.
PIPs with higher own precedence also provide competitors with more opportunities to learn about the ﬁrm, as each additional
PIP offers some information about the ﬁrm's underlying pricing strategy (Eliashberg & Robertson, 1988). This, in turn, is likely to
increase competitors' likelihood of identifying the best response to a ﬁrm's PIP (Montgomery, Moore, & Urbany, 2005), hence in-
creasing the ﬁrm's vulnerability to competition. As such, from a competitive perspective, making frequent PIPs is likely to reduce
investors' expectations on the future cash ﬂows for the ﬁrm.
In summary, concerns from the customer, economic and competitive perspectives suggest that higher own precedence of prior
PIPs is likely to lower investors' expectations about the future cash ﬂows for the ﬁrm leading to lower associated abnormal returns.
1.3.2. Competitive precedence
The number of PIPs made by a ﬁrm's competitors before its current PIP reﬂects the competitive precedence of a PIP. Customers
evaluate the fairness of a ﬁrm's preannounced price increase by comparing it with competitors' prices and pricing practices (Bolton
et al., 2003). If a ﬁrm makes a PIP after a number of its competitors have done so, it is less likely for customers to perceive the
preannounced price increase as unfair because the new price is comparable to the prices offered in the market (Xia et al., 2004).
From an economic perspective, however, higher competitive precedence is likely to result in a negative effect on the ﬁrm's ex-
pected future cash ﬂows. When a ﬁrm makes a PIP with higher competitive precedence, investors may perceive its delay in raising
prices as “leaving money on the table” (Prushan, 1997). By waiting for its competitors to make PIPs, the ﬁrm foregoes an oppor-
tunity to accrue higher cash ﬂows (Marn et al., 2004).
Furthermore, higher competitive precedence also signals to investors that the ﬁrm is not conﬁdent about its ability to increase
prices without losing customers (Keil, Reibstein, & Wittink, 2001). That is, the ﬁrm appears to lack a loyal customer base since it
can only make a PIP after the industry has become accustomed to the notion of price increases. In this way, the lack of conﬁdence
is likely to signal the ﬁrm's vulnerability to competitors' actions (Prabhu & Stewart, 2001). As such, from a competitive perspective,
competitive precedence is likely to have a negative impact on the expected future cash ﬂows for the ﬁrm.
Taken together, although the customer perspective proposes a positive effect of competitive precedence, economic and compet-
itive considerations suggest that competitive precedence is likely to have a negative effect on shareholder value. Thus, we expect
higher competitive precedence of prior PIPs to result in lower associated abnormal returns.
2. Method
To identify PIPs, we use the electronic search engine FACTIVA that allows us to search all major US-based newspapers and
trade publications to identify PIPs made between 2010 and 2014 by publicly-listed US ﬁrms.4 We do not consider observations
from utility, ﬁnance and insurance industries, as prices in these industries are typically heavily regulated (Morgan & Rego,
2009). This resulted in 749 observations from 128 ﬁrms.
To avoid potential confounds, we do not consider announcements that are in close proximity (±2 days) to other major events
(for details, see Web Appendix A). In addition, we eliminate PIPs if we cannot determine their release date, and if their accounting
and stock-returns data are not available in COMPUSTAT and the University of Chicago Centre for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). In case of multiple release dates, we use the earliest date as the release date of the PIP. These criteria produced a prelim-
inary sample of 621 PIPs from 113 ﬁrms. Since we focus on the time to implementation and magnitude of a PIP, we use the PIPs
that provided information about these variables. Our ﬁnal sample consists of 274 PIPs between 2010 and 2014 from 80 ﬁrms (for
details, see Web Appendix B).5
4 We only consider non-commodity PIPs because commodities such as oil and natural gas are heavily traded in commodity exchanges. We identify a product as a
commodity if it is listed on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) (Bruno, Che, & Dutta, 2012). Using FACTIVA's “Intelligent Indexing”, we restrict our search to only
US publications by selecting a source grouping (i.e., Publications – By Region) and a regional indexing term (i.e., United States) in FACTIVA. The keywords used in the
search are combinations of “price” and “increase”, “jump”, hike”, “raise”, “rise”, “increment”, etc. In addition,wedonot consider PIPs from foreign companies listed in the
US, as prior research in ﬁnance suggests that investors may possess different preferences for domestic versus foreign equities (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999).
5 For all subsequentmentions of PIPs,we are referring to PIPs that provide information on time to implementation andmagnitude.However,wewill also consider the
larger sample of 621 PIPs (i.e., thereby also considering the PIPs that donot disclose information on time to implementation and/ormagnitude of a PIP) in our sensitivity
analyses. The reduction in the ﬁnal sample size (i.e., 274) from the total number of public preannouncements of price increases (i.e., 749) is consistent with prior event
studies in marketing. Hsu and Lawrence (2016), for example, start with 2124 announcements of public recalls and use a ﬁnal sample of 185 announcements.
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We estimate abnormal returns following a PIP as a function of the information available to investors on the day when the PIP is
made. As such, all variables are measured as of the day of the PIP. For the variables that reﬂect periodically released ﬁrm ﬁnancial
information, we use the annual report released in the closest ﬁnancial year preceding the PIP. Following prior work (e.g., Rust &
Huang, 2012), we identify the ﬁrm's industry using its six-digit North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) code.
2.1. Dependent variable
We adopt the event-study method and estimate the abnormal returns following a PIP. According to the efﬁcient-market hy-
pothesis, stock prices reﬂect the impact of all publicly-available information about a ﬁrm on its future cash ﬂows (MacKinlay,
1997). When a ﬁrm makes a PIP, investors update their expectations of the ﬁrm's future cash ﬂows and adjust the price of the
ﬁrm's stock accordingly. If investors expect the PIP to result in an increase (decrease) in future cash ﬂows, the stock price will in-
crease (decrease). The beneﬁt of an event-study is that it allows an inference of cause (PIPs) and effect (abnormal returns) in a
quasi-experimental setting (Srinivasan & Hanssens, 2009). The approach is widely used to assess investors' evaluations of market-
ing actions, such as CMO successions (e.g., Wang, Saboo, & Grewal, 2015) and product recalls (e.g., Hsu & Lawrence, 2016).
We assess the effect of a PIP (the “event”) on the stock price of a ﬁrm by estimating the change in its stock price after account-
ing for ﬁrm and market factors (i.e., the risk-adjusted abnormal stock return of the ﬁrm) during a speciﬁed time window around the
event date. The risk-adjusted abnormal stock return of the focal ﬁrm is measured as the difference between the ﬁrm's expected
and actual stock returns (Eq. (1)):
ARijt ¼ Rijt− aij þ βijRmt þ sijSMBt þ hijHMLt þ uijUMDt
 
; ð1Þ
where ARijt is the abnormal return of ﬁrm i of industry j on day t (i.e., the day of the PIP), Rijt is the ﬁrms' actual stock return, Rmt
the return on a value-weighted portfolio of the total stock market, SMBt the Fama and French (1993) size portfolio return, HMLt
the Fama and French (1993) book-to-market-ratio portfolio return, and UMDt the Carhart (1997) momentum portfolio return, all
on day t. aij, βij, sij, hij and uij are parameters estimated over a 250 day period ending 30 days before the event date. We use the
CRSP database to obtain daily stock returns from a value-weighted market index comprising all stocks on NASDAQ and NYSE.
2.2. Independent variables
2.2.1. Time to implementation
Time to Implementation is measured as the number of days between the date of the PIP and the date the preannounced price
increase becomes effective (for examples, see Web Appendix C, Table C1). PIPs in our sample were made as early as 131 days
(W.R. Grace and Company in August 2010) or as late as one day (Carpenter Technology in April 2011) before implementation.
2.2.2. Magnitude
We measure the magnitude of the preannounced price increase as the percentage change in the price of the ﬁrm's product
and/or service before and after the PIP (for examples, see Web Appendix C, Table C1). In our sample, ﬁrms make PIPs with mag-
nitudes ranging from as low as 1% (Starbucks in June 2013) to as high as 63% (DISH Network Corporation in December 2013).
2.2.3. Demand and cost attribution
We measure attribution through the reasons given in the PIP to justify the increase in price. To identify the reasons for the
preannounced price increase, the PIPs were ﬁrst content-analyzed to identify phrases and combinations of words that are com-
monly used to justify the need for a price increase.
To identify PIPs with a demand attribution, the keywords include combinations of words such as, “demand”, “proﬁt(s)”, “revenue(s)”,
“growth”, and “increase”, “change”, “strong”. In addition,we used speciﬁc phrases such as “facilitate organic growth”, “rebalance themar-
ketplace”, “support continued growth and investment”. In coding PIPs with a cost attribution, the set of keywords includes combinations
ofwords such as “cost” or “costs” and “increase”, “input”, “operating”, “transportation”, “logistic”, “rawmaterials” (for examples, seeWeb
Appendix C, Table C2).
Second, two judges independently examined the PIPs to identify the attributions, and then compared notes to arrive at an
agreement. We ﬁnd that 76 out of 274 (i.e., 28%) of the PIPs in our sample cite demand attributions while 138 out of 274
(i.e., 50%) of the PIPs in our sample cite cost attributions.
2.2.4. Own and competitive precedence
Following Warren and Sorescu (2017), we measure own (competitive) precedence as the natural logarithm of the number of
PIPs by the ﬁrm (competitors) in the year preceding the focal PIP, where we deﬁne competitors as ﬁrms within the same six-digit
NAICS code as the focal ﬁrm.6 We compute these variables using PIPs from the most recent year because prior research suggests
6 The computation ofOwnPrecedence andCompetitive Precedence also includes price-increase announcements that 1)were post-announcements, 2)weremade on
the day the announced price increase becomes effective, 3) do not provide sufﬁcient information about themagnitude of the change in prices and the effective date of
the announced price increase, and 4) were in close proximity (i.e., ±2 days) to other events such as earnings announcements. In addition, the computation of Compet-
itive Precedence also includes PIPs that were from foreign companies listed in the US.
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that investors weight recent information more heavily (Sorescu et al., 2007). Using a one-year time window not only allows suf-
ﬁcient variation to examine the PIP history of the ﬁrm and its competitors, it also more accurately captures the investors' state of
mind when they are evaluating the ﬁrm's PIP (e.g., Warren & Sorescu, 2017). We ﬁnd that some ﬁrms made as many as 30 PIPs in
the preceding year, while others did not make any PIPs during that period. For competitive precedence, we ﬁnd that while some
PIPs are preceded by 48 competitive PIPs, others are the ﬁrst PIP to be made in the industry within a year. Finally, to account for
potential diminishing returns to scale effects of our continuous drivers, we take the natural logarithm of Time to Implementation,
Magnitude, and Own and Competitive Precedence.7
2.3. Control variables
We control for several factors that are likely to have an impact on abnormal returns. First, we control for ﬁrm-related non-
ﬁnancial variables that may result in systematic differences in investors' evaluations of a PIP. Research in consumer behaviour
and psychology suggests that the source of price information “can inﬂuence evaluations and perceptions of outcomes”
(Campbell, 2007, p. 262). Since PIP made by the top management team or the chief executive ofﬁcer can be perceived differently
from PIPs made by other members of the ﬁrm (Sorescu et al., 2007), we account for the Spokesperson of the PIP as a control var-
iable in our model.
Prior research suggests that the ﬁrm's overall reputation is likely to inﬂuence investors' evaluations of its announcements,
where investors might discount the reliability of PIPs from low-reputation ﬁrms (Sorescu et al., 2007). Consistent with existing
research, we use a ﬁrm's presence on Fortune magazine's Most Admired Company list to account for the ﬁrm's overall Reputation
(e.g., Mishra & Modi, 2016).
In addition, due to the potential spill-over effects of a PIP from one brand to other brands in the ﬁrm's portfolio (e.g., Larkin,
2013), the impact of a PIP from a mono-brand ﬁrm may differ signiﬁcantly from that of a multi-brand ﬁrm. Hence, we control for
whether a ﬁrm adopts a Corporate Branding strategy. Following Rao, Agarwal, and Dahlhoff (2004), we determine the branding
strategy of ﬁrms for a particular ﬁnancial year by examining their 10-K statements obtained from the SEC (U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission) and their corporate webpages to uncover information regarding the product and/or service brands marketed
by these ﬁrms. A ﬁrm is coded as having a corporate branding strategy if it predominantly uses its corporate name on its products
and/or services.
Following prior research, we also control for several ﬁrm ﬁnancial characteristics. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm's proﬁtability encompasses
ﬁnancial information that inﬂuences investors' evaluations of a ﬁrm's stock (Luo, 2007). Following Gruca and Rego (2005), we use
both a ﬁrms' net operating Cash Flows and earnings, measured by its Return on Assets, to account for its proﬁtability. To take into
account the capital structure of the ﬁrm, we include Leverage and Liquidity, as investors are likely to prefer ﬁrms with lower le-
verage (Malshe & Agarwal, 2015) and higher liquidity (Luo, Homburg, & Wieseke, 2010). Since investors tend to have a preference
for the stocks of larger ﬁrms (Rubera & Kirca, 2012), we also control for Firm Size. Prior research suggests that the expected proﬁts
following a PIP are likely to be different for ﬁrms facing different operating costs (Rust, Moorman, & Dickson, 2002). As such, we
include a ﬁrm's cost of goods sold, i.e., its COGS, as a control variable. Finally, we also control for a ﬁrm's Capital Intensity as
capital- (vs. labor-) intensive ﬁrms are likely to adopt different operating strategies (McAlister, Srinivasan, Jindal, & Cannella,
2016).
We include several industry covariates to account for the differences in investor responses to PIPs across industries. First, we
control for the competitive structure of an industry by including both the total Number of Firms in the industry and the Industry
Concentration (to account for the distribution of the market shares of ﬁrms). Following Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp (2008),
we also include Industry Growth and Turbulence as they are likely to have an impact on ﬁrm value. We also account for whether
or not a PIP is made by a ﬁrm operating in a Service Industry, as investors may evaluate the stock of a product- (vs. service-) fo-
cused ﬁrm differently (Morgan & Rego, 2009). Finally, we control for whether a ﬁrm is operating in a Business-to-Consumer in-
dustry as the price dynamics in such industries are typically different from industries that sell mainly to businesses.
Table 2 outlines the control variables, their measures, data sources and examples of studies that support the use of these
measures.
2.4. Model speciﬁcation
We test our expectations using Eq. (2), where the abnormal returns (ARijt) are a function of the information that investors have
at the time of the preannouncement:
ARijt ¼ γ0 þ γ1TIMEijt þ γ2MAGijt þ γ3DBijt þ γ4CBijt þ γ5OWNijt þ γ6COMPijt þ γ7CNTRLSijt þ ϵijt; ð2Þ
where TIMEijt and MAGijt are the (log-transformed) time to implementation and magnitude of the preannounced increase featured
in the PIP from ﬁrm i of industry j on day t, DBijt and CBijt are dummy variables indicating whether or not there are demand and
cost attributions, OWNijt and COMPijt represent the (log-transformed) own and competitive precedence, and the coefﬁcient vector
7 Since Time to Implementation, Magnitude, Own Precedence and Competitive Precedence can have very small values, we use the transformation of, for example, ln
(Time to Implementation+1) to compute the log-transformation of Time to Implementation. A similar transformationwas performed forMagnitude, Own Precedence
and Competitive Precedence.
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γ7 denotes the effect of the set of control variables CNTRLSijt (i.e., Spokesperson, Reputation, Corporate Branding, Cash Flows,
Return on Assets, Leverage, Liquidity, Firm Size, COGS, Capital Intensity, Number of Firms, Industry Concentration, Industry Growth,
Industry Turbulence, Service Industry and Business-to-Consumer). To account for the potential correlation among PIPs from ﬁrms
within the same industry, we allow the error terms of observations of ﬁrms within an industry to be correlated with each other
(Robinson, Tuli, & Kohli, 2015).
Using OLS to estimate the proposed model (i.e., Eq. (2)) can lead to biased estimates as there are two potential sources of
endogeneity (Gielens, Geyskens, Deleersnyder, & Nohe, 2017). First, because some of the factors that inﬂuence the abnormal
Table 2
Control variables, measures, and data sources.
Variable Measure Source Prior Support
Spokesperson Equals 1 if the PIP is made by members of the top
management team or the chief executive ofﬁcer; 0
otherwise.
FACTIVA Sorescu et al. (2007)
Reputation Equals 1 for ﬁrms that were on the list of Fortune
magazine's Most Admired Company; 0 otherwise.
Fortune Magazine Most
Admired Company
Mishra and Modi (2016)
Corporate branding Equals 1 if the ﬁrm predominantly uses its
corporate name on its products and/or services; 0
otherwise.
SEC; Company Webpage Rao et al. (2004)
Cash ﬂows Net cash ﬂows from operating activities of the ﬁrm
(DT: OANCF) scaled by its total assets (DT: AT).
COMPUSTAT Vomberg, Homburg, and
Bornemann (2015)
ROA The ﬁrm's operating income (DT: OIBDP) scaled by
its total assets (DT: AT).
COMPUSTAT Fang et al. (2008)
Leverage Ratio of the ﬁrm's total long-term debt (DT: DLTT)
to its market capitalization, where market
capitalization is the product of the stock price (DT:
PRCC) and the total number of outstanding shares
(DT: CSHO).
COMPUSTAT Grewal, Chandrashekaran,
and Citrin (2010)
Liquidity Ratio of the current assets (DT: ACT) to the current
liabilities (DT: LCT).
COMPUSTAT Luo et al. (2010)
Firm size The natural logarithm of a ﬁrm's total revenues
(DT: REVT).
COMPUSTAT Robinson et al. (2015)
COGS Ratio of the ﬁrm's cost of goods sold expenses (DT:
COGS) to the ﬁrm's total revenues (DT: REVT).
COMPUSTAT Mittal, Anderson, Sayrak, and
Tadikamalla (2005)
Capital intensity Ratio of the ﬁrm's net plant, property, and
equipment (DT: PPENT) to its total assets (DT: AT).
COMPUSTAT McAlister et al. (2016)
Number of ﬁrms The natural logarithm of the total number of ﬁrms
in an industry at the end of each ﬁscal year
COMPUSTAT Nachum and Zaheer (2005)
Industry concentration Hirschman–Herﬁndahl index (HHI) within the
ﬁrm's six-digit NAICS (DT: REVT).
COMPUSTAT Fang, Palmatier, and Grewal
(2011)
Industry growth Average of the three year-over-year revenue
growth in an industry, where the year-over-year
revenue growth is the percentage change in the
sum of the revenues of the ﬁrms within the same
six-digit NAICS code at the end of the current ﬁscal
year from the end of the preceding ﬁscal year (DT:
REVT).
COMPUSTAT Bahadir, Bharadwaj, and
Srivastava (2008)
Industry turbulence Standard deviation of the sum of the revenues of
the ﬁrms in the same six-digit NAICS code across
the prior four years divided by the mean value of
the sum of the total revenues of the ﬁrms within
the same six-digit NAICS code for those four years
(DT: REVT).
COMPUSTAT Fang et al. (2008)
Service industry Firms with a six-digit NAICS code beginning with
42–92 are coded as ﬁrms in the service industry.
COMPUSTAT Rust and Huang (2012)
Business-to-Consumer Equals to 1 if the ﬁrm's six-digit NAICS code sells
mostly to end-consumers; 0 otherwise.
COMPUSTAT Kalaignanam and Cem Bahadir
(2013)
Exclusion restrictions for selection equation
Percentage of institutional holdings Percentage of shares outstanding with all reporting
institutions for each ﬁrm (DT: INSTOWN_PERC).
Thomson Financial Institutional
Holdings (13F)
Nagel (2005)
Economic growth Percentage change in gross domestic product
(based on current dollars) reported in the
preceding ﬁscal quarter.
BEA of the US Department of
Commerce
Lee and Grewal (2004)
Year dummy variables Year dummy variables for 2010–2014 (reference
year: 2010)
FACTIVA Homburg, Vollmayr, and Hahn
(2014)
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement; DT = Data Item; SEC = U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis;
ROA = Return on Assets; COGS = Cost of Goods Sold; NAICS = North American Industry Classiﬁcation System. All variables in this table are measured using
the ﬁnancial information from the annual report released in the closest ﬁnancial year preceding the PIP. In line with prior research, we replace the missing values
of the following variables with zero: long-term debt (e.g., Robinson et al., 2015) and percentage of institutional holdings (e.g., Nagel, 2005).
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returns might also affect the ﬁrm's probability of making a PIP, the model speciﬁed in Eq. (2) is likely to yield biased estimates due
to a selection bias (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). For example, whereas investors are likely to view price increases less favorably
for ﬁrms with lower proﬁtability, such ﬁrms are also more likely to make a PIP. Thus, we specify a selection model to estimate a
ﬁrm's likelihood of making a PIP to address this concern.
Second, our expected main effects can also potentially suffer from omitted variable bias, as these variables could be correlated
with unobservable factors that affect the abnormal returns following a PIP. To address this concern, we follow Gielens et al. (2017)
and draw upon Park and Gupta's (2012) Gaussian copulas approach to account for the potential endogeneity of the continous PIP
characteristics (Time to Implementation, Magnitude, Own and Competitive Precedence). In addition, we use the Hausman-Wu test
to assess the potential endogeneity of the dummy variables that reﬂect, respectively, Demand and Cost Attribution (e.g., Clement,
Wu, & Fischer, 2014).
2.4.1. Addressing selection bias
We jointly estimate Eq. (2), i.e., the outcome model, and the selection model (Eq. (3)) using Maximum Likelihood (ML), as
opposed to the Heckman (1979) two-step estimation as it produces more efﬁcient estimates (Breen, 1996):
LICijT ¼ δ0 þ δ1REPijT þ δ2CORPijT þ δ3CFTAijT þ δ4ROAijT þ δ5LEVijT þ δ6LIQijT
þδ7SIZEijT þ δ8COGSijT þ δ9CIijT þ δ10NFjT þ δ11ICjT þ δ12IGjT þ δ13ITjT
þδ14SVCj þ δ15B2Cj þ δ16INSTijT þ δ17EGijT þ∑21k¼18δkYEART
h i
þ μ ijT
ð3Þ
where LICijT is 1 if ﬁrm i in industry j made a PIP in year T, else 0, ϵijt is the error term for the outcome model ~N(0,1), μijT is the
error term for the selection model ~N(0,1), and ρ denotes the correlation between ϵijt and μijT.
The selection model includes several of the ﬁrm and industry control variables that are also included in the outcome model as
these variables arguably affect not just the abnormal returns following a PIP, but are likely to also inﬂuence whether or not a ﬁrm
makes a PIP.8 Speciﬁcally, we include Reputation (REPijT) and Corporate Branding (CORPijT) because the ﬁrm's overall reputation
and/or branding strategy is likely to inﬂuence customers' price sensitivity toward its products and services (Bharadwaj, Tuli, &
Bonfrer, 2011), and hence can affect its likelihood to make a PIP.
Firms with lower Cash Flows (CFTAijT) and Return on Assets (ROAijT) but higher COGS (COGSijT) and Capital Intensity (CIijT) are
more likely to preannounce a price increase. This is because such ﬁrms generally have lower proﬁts, and hence need the additional
revenues expected from the PIP more than ﬁrms that already have higher earnings or lower costs (Homburg et al., 2005). Thus, we
include these variables in the selection model. We also include Leverage (LEVijT) and Liquidity (LIQijT), as a ﬁrm with higher lever-
age and lower liquidity is more likely to preannounce a price increase to realize an increase in cash ﬂows (Robinson et al., 2015).
Finally, we also include Firm Size (SIZEijT), as larger ﬁrms are more likely to make a PIP as they have more power to exert control
and inﬂuence consumption patterns within the industry (Rubera & Kirca, 2012).
The selection model also accounts for factors that reﬂect a ﬁrm's operating environment. Firms in monopolistic markets and/or
more concentrated industries are more likely to make a PIP as lower competition results in higher prices (Ramaswamy, Gatignon,
& Reibstein, 1994). Thus, we include both Number of Firms (NFjT) and Industry Concentration (ICjT) in the selection model. Sim-
ilarly, ﬁrms in industries with greater Industry Growth (IGjT) and Industry Turbulence (ITjT) are more likely to preannounce a price
increase, because customers are less sensitive to prices in growing markets (Ramaswamy, Desarbo, Reibstein, & Robinson, 1993),
and are less likely to switch to unfamiliar brands in turbulent markets (Erdem & Keane, 1996). Finally, given that our sample also
includes PIPs from service-focused ﬁrms and/or ﬁrms that sell mainly to end-consumers, we also include Service Industry (SVCj)
and Business-to-Consumer (B2Cj) in the selection model to control for potential systematic differences in ﬁrms' likelihood to make
a PIP in these industries.
The selection model includes some additional variables – exclusion restrictions – that are not incorporated in the outcome
model (i.e., the variables in the square brackets in Eq. (3)). A ﬁrm with a higher percentage of institutional holdings is under
greater scrutiny to reduce information asymmetry through the disclosure of information that may affect its future cash ﬂows
(Bushee & Noe, 2000). Since a price increase is likely to affect the future cash ﬂows of a ﬁrm, we expect that ﬁrms with a higher
percentage of institutional holdings are more likely to preannounce a price increase. That said, according to the efﬁcient-market
hypothesis, there is no reason to expect investors' evaluations of a PIP to be inﬂuenced by the level of institutional holdings of
a ﬁrm's outstanding shares (Fama, 1991). As such, we include Percentage of Institutional Holdings (INSTijT) as an exclusion
restriction.
Firms are less likely to make PIPs during periods of low economic growth as customers tend to be more price conscious in their
purchase decisions and likely to slow down their spending (Deleersnyder, Dekimpe, Sarvary, & Parker, 2004). As such, we also in-
clude Economic Growth (EGijT) as an exclusion restriction. Finally, to account for the argument that unobserved time-related
events may have inﬂuenced the ﬁrms' likelihood of making a PIP, we include Year Dummy variables (YEART) that correspond
to the year in which the PIP was made. However, economic growth and the year dummy variables do not inﬂuence the abnormal
returns. This is because the calculation of abnormal returns includes the return on a value-weighted portfolio of the total stock
8 Someﬁrmand industry factors included in the outcomemodel cannot be conceptualized/measured in the absence of a PIP (i.e., Time to Implementation,Magnitude,
Demand Attribution, Cost Attribution, Own Precedence, Competitive Precedence and Spokesperson). Therefore, these variables are not included in the selectionmodel.
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market (i.e., Rmt in Eq. (1)), which already takes into account the macro-economic factors and the year-speciﬁc effects using overall
stock-market returns (Flannery & Protopapadakis, 2002).9
We outline the exclusion restrictions, their measures, data sources and examples of prior literature supporting the use of these
measures in Table 2. In addition, we also describe how we arrive at the sample for the selection model in Web Appendix D.
2.4.2. Addressing potential endogeneity
Following recent event studies in marketing (e.g., Gielens et al., 2017), we adopt Park and Gupta's (2012) Gaussian copulas
approach to account for the potential endogeneity of our expected continous variables. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst assess the distribution
of Time to Implementation, Magnitude, Own Precedence and Competitive Precedence to conﬁrm the suitability of this method.
Results from the Shapiro-Wilk test suggest that these variables are not normally distributed (WTIMEijt = 0.95, p b 0.001; WMAGijt =
0.98, p b 0.001; WOWNijt = 0.97, p b 0.001; WCOMPijt = 0.92, p b 0.001). In this way, the inclusion of the copula correction terms for
these variables through a control function approach allows us to separate the variation due to these variables from that of the
error term so that the effects of these variables can be estimated consistently (Papies, Ebbes, & van Heerde, 2017). Following
Park and Gupta (2012), we obtain the copula correction terms as follows:
cop TIMEijt
 
¼ ϕ−1 H TIMEijt
  
; cop MAGijt
 
¼ ϕ−1 H MAGijt
  
;
cop OWNijt
 
¼ ϕ−1 H OWNijt
  
; cop COMPijt
 
¼ ϕ−1 H COMPijt
  
;
ð4–7Þ
where ϕ−1 is the inverse of the cummulative normal distribution function, and H(TIMEijt), H(MAGijt), H(OWNijt) and H(COMPijt) are
the empirical distribution functions. These copula correction terms are ﬁrst added one at a time to ourmodel to test for their statistical
signiﬁcance. We only keep the statistically signiﬁcant copula correction terms in our ﬁnal model as the terms that are not statistically
signiﬁcant suggest that their corresponding variables are not endogeneous (Gielens et al., 2017; Park & Gupta, 2012).
As the distribution of dummy variables is not suitable for the Gaussian copulas approach, we draw on an alternative procedure
to address the potential endogeneity of Demand Attribution and Cost Attribution. Following recent studies in marketing
(e.g., Clement et al., 2014), we assess the endogeneity of these variables using the Hausman-Wu test. In particular, we ﬁrst esti-
mate two auxiliary regressions using Demand Attribution and Cost Attribution as the dependent variables, along with the excluded
variable and all other control variables that we include in our focal model.
Drawing on existing marketing studies that use lagged variables as exclusion restrictions (e.g., Albers, 2012), we use the
attribution that the ﬁrm cites in its previous PIP as the excluded variable in both of the auxiliary regressions. We argue that the
attribution that the ﬁrm cites in its previous PIP is a valid exclusion restriction because ﬁrms tend to adopt similar decision choices
over a short time period such that if the ﬁrm cites a demand attribution in its previous PIP, it is likely to also cite a demand
attribution in its current PIP. However, this excluded variable is unlikely to inﬂuence abnormal returns following the current
9 To verify our exclusion restrictions, we estimated a model where the exclusion restrictions were included as additional control variables in the outcome equation.
Consistent with our expectations, we ﬁnd that their joint effect on abnormal returns is not signiﬁcant (χ2(6) = 6.85, p N 0.10).
Table 3
Abnormal returns, N = 274.
Day Average AR (in %) Number of
PIPs with
positive
(Negative)
AR
% of PIPs
with positive
(Negative)
AR
CSectErr (t) p-value Rank Test (Z) p-value Jackknife (Z) p-value
−5 0.01 133 (141) 49 (51) 0.06 0.48 −0.01 0.50 −0.26 0.40
−4 0.12 140 (134) 51 (49) 1.14 0.13 0.61 0.27 −0.03 0.49
−3 0.03 132 (142) 48 (52) 0.29 0.39 −0.20 0.42 −0.45 0.33
−2 −0.13 117 (157) 43 (57) −1.17 0.12 −1.90 0.03 −1.67 0.05
−1 0.06 144 (130) 53 (47) 0.66 0.25 1.35 0.09 1.02 0.15
0 0.22 155 (119) 57 (43) 2.31 0.01 2.49 0.01 2.49 0.01
1 0.29 155 (119) 57 (43) 3.39 0.00 2.51 0.01 2.41 0.01
2 0.04 135 (139) 49 (51) 0.44 0.33 0.43 0.33 0.48 0.32
3 0.02 134 (140) 49 (51) 0.22 0.41 0.33 0.37 −0.17 0.43
4 0.00 133 (141) 49 (51) 0.01 0.50 0.17 0.43 −0.08 0.47
5 −0.05 133 (141) 49 (51) −0.66 0.26 −0.76 0.22 −1.47 0.07
Notes. PIP = Price-Increase Preannouncement; N = Number of observations pertaining to the outcome equation; AR = Abnormal returns; CSectErr (t) = Cross-
Sectional Error t-statistic. The p-values are two-sided. Consistent with existing studies (e.g., Robinson et al., 2015), in determining the signiﬁcance of the abnormal
returns, we use a parametric test – the Cross-Sectional Error t-test (Brown & Warner, 1985) – and two nonparametric tests – the Rank test (Corrado, 1989) and
the Jackknife test (Giaccotto & Sﬁridis, 1996).
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PIP as the efﬁcient-market hypothesis suggests that the stock price of the ﬁrm can only be inﬂuenced by the information provided
in the ﬁrm's current PIP (MacKinlay, 1997).10
Upon obtaining the predicted values from the auxiliary regressions, we then include these values as instruments for Demand
Attribution and Cost Attribution in our focal model using a stepwise approach. Each estimation is accompanied by a χ2-test to as-
sess the statistical signiﬁcance of the instruments. Results suggest that the potential endogeneity of Demand Attribution and Cost
Attribution is not an issue, as we ﬁnd that neither test is signiﬁcant (p = 0.36 for Demand Attribution and p = 0.90 for Cost
Attribution).
3. Results
Table 3 reports the abnormal returns on the day of the PIP, as well as up to 5 days before and after the PIP. We use both a
parametric test, the Cross-Sectional Error t-test (Brown & Warner, 1985), and two nonparametric tests, the Rank test (Corrado,
1989) and the Jackknife test (Giaccotto & Sﬁridis, 1996), to test the signiﬁcance of the abnormal returns.
Across the three tests, we ﬁnd that the abnormal returns are most signiﬁcant on day t + 1, with a positive abnormal return of
0.29% (p b 0.00). In addition, the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) is most signiﬁcant for the event window [0, 1].
Thus, we use the CAAR for the event window [0, 1] as the dependent variable to test the proposed expectations. We ﬁnd that
the CAAR for the event window [0, 1] is 0.51%. However, there is wide variation in the CAARs. Almost 41% of the PIPs experience
a negative CAAR. In terms of the range, while some PIPs yield returns as low as −5.04%, other PIPs result in positive returns as
high as 15.59%. Clearly, investors' evaluations differ considerably across PIPs.
Table 4 reports the estimation results (we refer to Web Appendix E, Table E1 for the descriptive statistics). The maximum VIF
statistic of the model is 5.93, well below the threshold of 10, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue for our model. We
report one-sided signiﬁcance levels for the parameter estimates of the directional expectations, and two-sided signiﬁcance levels
for all other parameter estimates.
We ﬁrst discuss the results of our selection equation. The error correlation is not signiﬁcant (ρ = − 0.20,p N 0.10), indicating
that selection bias is not a serious concern. We ﬁnd support for the exclusion restrictions as we ﬁnd that a higher percentage of
institutional holdings results in a higher likelihood of making a PIP (δ16 = 0.70,p b 0.05). In addition, relative to 2010, there is a
lower likelihood of making a PIP in all subsequent years, except in 2011 (δ18 = − 0.05,p N 0.01;δ19 = − 0.56,p b 0.01;δ20 =
− 0.77,p b 0.01;δ21 = − 0.52,p b 0.01). However, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms' likelihood of making PIPs does not differ across different
periods of economic growth (δ17 = 0.02,p N 0.10).
Consistent with our expectations, we ﬁnd that greater time to implementation results in lower associated abnormal returns
(γ1 = − 0.26,p b 0.01), while a PIP citing demand attribution results in higher associated abnormal returns (γ3 =
0.36,p b 0.05). In addition, we also ﬁnd that higher own and competitive precedence result in lower associated abnormal returns
(γ5 = − 0.29,p b 0.05;γ6 = − 0.22,p b 0.05). With regards to the effect of magnitude on the associated abnormal returns, we
ﬁnd that results support the expectation of a positive impact (γ2 = 2.28,p b 0.05). Finally, contrary to expectations, there is insuf-
ﬁcient evidence to support our prediction that providing a cost attribution in a PIP results in lower associated abnormal returns
(γ4 = 0.23,p N 0.10).
3.1. Sensitivity analyses
We conducted several sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of our conclusions.11
3.1.1. Alternative dependent variables
We examine the sensitivity of our results by using alternative methods to compute the dependent variable. First, we use the
abnormal returns obtained from the estimation of two alternative models – the Fama and French (1993) three factor model
and the market model (Brown & Warner, 1985). Second, we also estimate the abnormal returns using an equally-weighted
market-index. Finally, following Skiera, Bayer, and Schöler (2017, p.6), we examine the robustness of our results to the abnormal
returns that account for only the value of the operating business. Our conclusions remain unchanged.
3.1.2. Sensitivity to outliers
Consistent with existing event studies in marketing (e.g., Robinson et al., 2015), we assess the impact of outliers by removing
observations with residuals at the one percentile of each tail. We ﬁnd the same results as in our focal analysis.
3.1.3. Alternative standard errors
We explore the sensitivity of our results to alternative computations of the standard errors in the following ways. First, to ac-
count for the possible correlation among multiple PIPs made by the same ﬁrm, we re-estimate the models by clustering the errors
10 The excluded variable for Demand (Cost) Attribution is measured as follows: =1 if the ﬁrm cites a demand (cost) attribution in its closest preceding PIP, =0 if the
ﬁrmdid not cite a demand (cost) attribution in its closest preceding PIP or did notmake any previous PIPs from the start of our data. Importantly, the excluded variables
were highly signiﬁcant in the auxiliary regressions (χ2(1)= 11.85, p b 0.001 for demand attribution exclusion;χ2(1)= 24.22, p b 0.001 for cost attribution exclusion),
which testiﬁes to the strength of the excluded variables.
11 An overview table and detailed estimation results on these robustness checks are provided in Web Appendix F.
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at the ﬁrm level. Second, we re-estimate a model with errors clustered at both the industry- and year-level to allow for possible
correlation among PIPs made by different ﬁrms within the same industry in the same year.12 Third, we also re-estimate the models
without the use of clustered standard errors, but using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Wooldridge, 2009). Across the
analyses, our conclusions remain unchanged.
3.1.4. Alternative industry classiﬁcation
Given that the number of ﬁrms included in the selection sample might vary depending on the granularity of the NAICS codes
utilized, we also consider an alternative industry classiﬁcation, and repeat the estimation process using ﬁve-digit NAICS codes.
Again, our substantive conclusions remain largely unchanged.
3.1.5. Heckman two-step estimation
We re-estimate our models using the more traditional Heckman (1979) two-step estimation technique. Our conclusions
remain unchanged.
3.1.6. Reputation of following through on PIPs
Whether a ﬁrm followed through on its previous PIP could affect investors' evaluations of its subsequent PIPs. To that extent,
we consider whether PIPs in our sample were preceded by announcements of a price increase retraction in the one year preceding
its preannouncement date. Speciﬁcally, we checked whether there were news articles reporting that the ﬁrm was cancelling,
delaying, or cutting back on a previously announced price increase, regardless of whether the announced price increase had
eventually been implemented. We ﬁnd that only 10 of the PIPs within our sample are preceded by such announcements. We
re-estimated our model by ﬁrst dropping these 10 PIPs. In addition, we estimated the model with an indicator variable for such
an occurrence. In both instances, our conclusions remain unchanged, while the parameter of the indicator variable is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant (p N 0.10).
3.1.7. Alternative measures
We assess the robustness of our model to alternative measures. First, to account for the possibility that the PIP history of the
ﬁrm and its competitors extend beyond a one-year period, we re-estimate our model using Own and Competitive Precedence
measured over a two-year time window. Second, we also estimate our model using an alternative measure of Reputation. In par-
ticular, we use the corporate social performance data from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) Social Ratings Database as an
alternative proxy for the ﬁrm's overall Reputation. The KLD database contains social ratings on how well a ﬁrm caters to issues like
climate change, waste management, employee involvement, product safety, corruption and political instability, and ﬁnancial-
system instability (MSCI ESG Research, 2015). Our conclusions remain unchanged.
3.1.8. Alternative method to address selection bias
The selection model speciﬁed in our focal analysis reﬂects a ﬁrm's decision to make a PIP on the condition that the PIPs provide
information on time to implementation and magnitude. To account for a possible sample selection bias due to the lack of informa-
tion on one, or both, of these variables, we specify a multinomial selection model to demonstrate an alternative decision structure.
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst-stage is a multinomial logit model that accounts for a ﬁrm's decision to make a PIP that provides information
on time to implementation and magnitude (n = 274), make a PIP with incomplete information (i.e., PIPs that do not provide in-
formation on either the time to implementation or the magnitude of the preannounced price increase or both; n = 347), or not
make a PIP at all (n = 3035).
Adopting the “conditional expectations correction method” as proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984), we use the parameter
estimates from the ﬁrst-stage model to obtain the predicted conditional probabilities for each of the decision outcomes given the
conditional probabilities of all other decision outcomes. These predicted conditional probabilities are then used to compute a set of
correction terms to be included in the second-stage model to control for the possible sample selection bias. Following
Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007), we include three correction terms to account for each of the three decision outcomes
and bootstrap the second-stage regression (500 bootstrap replications) to account for the standard errors from the ﬁrst-stage
model.
Results show that our substantive conclusions remain unchanged if we use this approach. Importantly, none of the coefﬁcients
of the correction terms are statistically signiﬁcant in the model (using a signiﬁcance level of p b 0.10), thus suggesting that sample
selection bias is not a concern in this decision structure. Relatedly, given that we also do not ﬁnd sufﬁcient evidence to conclude
that sample selection bias exists in the decision structure that we use in our focal analysis, we also re-estimate our model without
accounting for sample selection bias. We again ﬁnd that our results remain unchanged.
In addition, we also computed the abnormal returns following the PIPs with incomplete information using the event-study
method. We ﬁnd that the abnormal returns are not statistically signiﬁcant on the day of the PIP, as well as up to 5 days before
and after the PIP (for details, see Web Appendix F, Table F3). The CAAR for the event window [0, 1] is also not statistically signif-
icant (−0.05 % , p N 0.10). This analysis suggests that investors respond to PIPs only when the ﬁrm provides investors with imple-
mentation information, i.e., the Time to Implementation and Magnitude, as they need this information to make an educated
12 To cluster the standard errors at both the industry- and year-level, we use a variable that contains a unique value for each industry-year pair, i.e., we create this
variable by multiplying the ﬁrms' six-digit NAICS codes with the data year, and use this variable as the cluster variable (see Petersen, 2009 for a similar practice).
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estimate of the impact of a PIP on the change in future cash ﬂows for the ﬁrm. PIPs with incomplete information do not signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuence abnormal returns.
3.1.9. Alternative method to address potential endogeneity
We also explore the robustness of our results to alternative methods to deal with the potential endogeneity of some of our key
drivers. As a ﬁrst probe to assess the sensitivity of our results to the use of the copula approach, we dropped all such correction
terms. We ﬁnd that our results remain unchanged.
Second, we use instead Petrin and Train's (2010) two-stage control function approach. In a ﬁrst-stage, we estimate an auxiliary
regression with a given driver as dependent variable, and the control variables and an instrument as explanatory variables to ob-
tain predicted residuals. Based on Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal (2015), we include the sector average value of a given driver as
instrument. We identify a sector using a ﬁrm's three-digit NAICS code and compute the sector average values using the values
of all the competing ﬁrms in the same sector, excluding that of the focal ﬁrm. In the second-stage, we re-estimate our focal
model by including the predicted residuals from the ﬁrst-stage to account for the potential endogeneity of the driver. Given
that each of the main-effect variables can potentially be endogeneous, we estimate six auxiliary regressions in the ﬁrst-stage to
obtain six predicted residuals. Consistent with the empirical strategy of our focal analysis, we ﬁrst assess the statistical signiﬁcance
of each of these predicted residual terms by adding them one at a time to our focal model. Since endogeneity is not a concern for
variables in which their corresponding residual terms are not statistically signiﬁcant (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007; Liu, Liu, & Luo,
2016), we only retain the statistically signiﬁcant residual terms in our ﬁnal model to account for their potential endogeneity.
Reassuringly, our substantive conclusions remain unchanged when using this control function approach.
4. Discussion
Firms regularly preannounce their price increases because it signals their ability to raise prices (Krishna, Feinberg, & Zhang,
2007), provides timely information to customers and investors (Smith, 2011) and can act as a valuable competitive market signal
(Prabhu & Stewart, 2001). Existing research, however, offers neither a theoretical nor an empirical examination of how investors
evaluate public announcements of future price increases. This study seeks to ﬁll this void and has both theoretical and managerial
implications.
4.1. Theoretical implications
By presenting a systematic examination of how investors evaluate PIPs, we respond to recent calls for a better understanding of
investors' evaluations of ﬁrms' pricing actions (Edeling & Fischer, 2016, p. 533). Results indicate that, on average, a PIP leads to
positive abnormal returns of 0.51%, i.e., an increase of $30.45 million in a ﬁrm's market capitalization.13 This impact of a PIP is
comparable to other marketing actions, such as the announcements of internet channel additions (0.71%, £16.38 million, per
Geyskens et al., 2002) and brand licensing (0.33%, $37.52 million, per Robinson et al., 2015).
Interestingly, there is signiﬁcant variation in investors' evaluations of a PIP with 41% of the PIPs resulting in negative abnormal
returns. Accordingly, we built a conceptual framework to examine investors' evaluations of PIPs. Our study makes two valuable
theoretical contributions to, respectively, the pricing and preannouncement literature.
First, we contribute to the pricing literature by examining investors' reactions toward price increases through their evaluations
of PIPs. Extant research focused on customers' perceptions of price increases (e.g., Homburg et al., 2005; Homburg et al., 2010). By
combining existing conclusions from the customer perspective with ﬁndings that reﬂect an economic and competitor perspective,
we develop important new insights on the likely outcomes of price increases.
Second, we contribute to the preannouncement literature by highlighting the importance of time to implementation, attribu-
tion and precedence when communicating an upcoming price increase. We ﬁnd that a PIP can result in lower abnormal returns
as time to implementation increases. These results complement recent research in other domains, such as new product introduc-
tions (Sorescu et al., 2007) and product recalls (Eilert, Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, & Swartz, 2017), that suggests that investors
are likely to punish ﬁrms that delay the implementation of preannounced marketing actions.
Our ﬁndings also reveal that a PIP can result in higher abnormal returns if it features a demand attribution. However, in con-
trast to our expectations, citing a cost attribution does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the impact of a PIP on abnormal returns. One
probable explanation for this result might be that with respect to a ﬁrm's costs, investors value the actual ﬁnancial information
more than the information provided in the preannouncement. Indeed, in Table 4, we observe that the impact of a ﬁrm's reported
COGS on abnormal returns is statistically signiﬁcant (p b 0.01). Taken together, the ﬁndings on demand and cost attributions add
to the literature on strategic preannouncements (e.g., Calantone & Schatzel, 2000; Sorescu et al., 2007), as they identify when the
provision of certain information is useful for investors.
13 We obtain these ﬁgures by multiplying the abnormal returns with the average market capitalization of the ﬁrms in our sample.
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4.2. Managerial implications
Our results provide clear “univariate” guidelines for conditions under which investors are likely to appreciate (or not) PIPs.
First, managers need to consider the importance of providing implementation information, i.e., time to implementation and mag-
nitude of the planned price increase if they want investors to react. Indeed, investors do not respond to PIPs that do not provide
this information. Second, managers should avoid making PIPs that have implementation dates too far into the future, as investors
prefer PIPs with lower time to implementation. In contrast, managers are likely to derive more beneﬁts from PIPs with higher (vs
lower) magnitude. That said, managers are unlikely to receive any incremental beneﬁts from extremely high price increases as
compared to just high-magnitude PIPs. Third, the study points to the beneﬁts of clear communication with investors as we ﬁnd
that investors reward PIPs where ﬁrms speciﬁcally mention rising demand as the underlying reason for a PIP. Finally, managers
need to be prudent in terms of the frequency with which they make PIPs as investors' responses show a clear preference for
PIPs that have lower precedence. In addition, managers need to be wary of being too much a follower, i.e., waiting for competitors
to make a PIP before announcing their own PIP, as investors tend to punish ﬁrms that simply follow competitors in making PIPs.
The univariate guidelines provide a foundation to explore the different multi-faceted scenarios that managers are likely to face
when considering making a PIP. Accordingly, we draw on prior work on retailer motivations behind price changes (e.g., Nijs,
Srinivasan, & Pauwels, 2007; Srinivasan, Pauwels, & Nijs, 2008) to conduct counterfactual analyses to explore investors' evaluations
of four pricing scenarios: demand-dominant, competitor driven, price sensitivity probing and cost-based (see Web Appendix G for
details).14
4.2.1. Demand-dominant
A ﬁrm makes a PIP largely due to higher demand and the anticipation that customers will remain with it following its PIP in a
demand-dominant pricing scenario. Given their conﬁdence about the loyalty of their customers, ﬁrms are likely to make PIPs with
low time to implementation and high magnitude. They are also likely to cite a demand-attribution in their PIPs to signal to
investors their current operating circumstances, i.e., rising demand.
4.2.2. Competitor driven
Firms are likely to make PIPs in hopes that its competitors will follow its PIP and hence minimize its market share loss and
other possible negative reactions from its customers. If competitors do not follow its PIP, the ﬁrm is unlikely to implement the
preannounced price increase. Thus, ﬁrms in this pricing scenario are likely to make PIPs with moderate time to implementation
to provide them with sufﬁcient time to observe their competitors' reactions. Since it is important that the preannounced price
increase is credible and is noticed by competitors, such PIPs are likely to have high magnitude. Finally, to avoid any suspicions
of lawmakers due to concerns of price collusion, competitor driven PIPs are likely to have low own and competitive precedence.
4.2.3. Price sensitivity probing
When ﬁrms are unable to anticipate customers' reactions toward their price increase, they are likely to adopt the price sensi-
tivity probing scenario to assess customers' reactions. As such, in this scenario, the ﬁrm is likely to have a high time to implemen-
tation as it allows them to see whether customers react strongly (or not) to the PIP, and whether competitors are likely to follow
the ﬁrm. Given the importance of assessing competitors' reactions, ﬁrms facing high competitive precedence are more likely to do
this.
4.2.4. Cost-based
In the cost-based pricing scenario, a ﬁrm makes a PIP because its costs are rising, and it feels the need to pass them on to cus-
tomers. This pricing scenario is likely to feature ﬁrms that make PIPs with a cost attribution to signal to investors its rising costs.
As shown in Table 5, across the four pricing scenarios, investors are likely to evaluate PIPs made in the demand-dominant pricing
scenariomost favorably (1.91%,p b 0.01) followed by competitor driven PIPs (1.83%,p b 0.01). Interestingly, both the price sensitivity
probing (−0.32 % , p N 0.10) and the cost-based (−0.07 % , p N 0.10) PIPs are likely to yield insigniﬁcant abnormal returns. Managers
are therefore encouraged to consider making a preannouncement of an upcoming price increase when confronted with a demand-
dominant or competitor driven scenario. In dollar terms, PIPs in the demand-dominant scenario are likely to increase the market
capitalization of an “average” ﬁrm, based on ﬁgures from a recent report (CRSP, 2018), by $145 million, whereas the ones that are
competitor driven are likely to have an impact of $139 million.
Results for price sensitivity probing and the cost-based scenarios suggest that managers making PIPs under these scenarios
should not expect a signiﬁcant reaction from investors. The reason is that both these scenarios present investors with opposing
signals. Speciﬁcally, in the price sensitivity probing scenario, the positive effects of the magnitude of a PIP are countered by the
high levels of time to implementation and competitive precedence. Similarly, the articulation of a cost-based attribution for the
PIP signals that any potential beneﬁts due to the potential increase in price are likely to be negated due to rising costs. Taken to-
gether, the results of the counterfactual analyses underscore the importance of jointly considering the factors proposed in current
study and identify the demand-dominant and competitor driven settings as the two scenarios that investors are likely to reward.
14 We are indebted to the Senior Editor for his/her valuable input in this classiﬁcation.
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4.3. Limitations and future research
Results of the current study should be interpreted in light of its limitations, some of which provide opportunities for future re-
search. First, future research can complement this study by examining the effect of PIPs on various operational metrics, such as
changes in sales revenues following the PIP or changes in the penetration and/or purchase frequency of the products involved in
the PIP.
Table 4
Factors predicting abnormal returns.
EXP Outcome model Coeff (SE)
− Time to implementation −0.26 (0.11)†††
? Magnitude 2.28 (1.12)⁎⁎
+ Demand attribution 0.36 (0.21)††
− Cost attribution 0.23 (0.23)
− Own precedence −0.29 (0.14)††
− Competitive precedence −0.22 (0.13)††
Firm-level controls
Spokesperson −0.08 (0.21)
Reputation 0.09 (0.35)
Corporate branding −0.32 (0.30)
Cash ﬂows −0.66 (3.74)
ROA 7.55 (3.68)⁎⁎
Leverage 0.27 (0.29)
Liquidity 0.03 (0.14)
Firm size −0.14 (0.14)
COGS 4.46 (1.26)⁎⁎⁎
Capital intensity −0.11 (1.11)
Industry-level controls
Number of ﬁrms 0.42 (0.28)
Industry concentration 0.63 (0.88)
Industry growth 0.03 (1.62)
Industry turbulence 1.04 (1.24)
Service industry −0.38 (0.49)
Business-to-consumer −0.46 (0.39)
Copula correction termsa
Copula correction term
for magnitude
−1.09 (0.66)⁎
Constant −6.93 (2.78)⁎⁎
Selection model Coeff (SE)
Firm-level controls
Reputation 0.14 (0.25)
Corporate branding −0.27 (0.23)
Cash Flows 1.68 (1.54)
ROA −3.04 (1.25)⁎⁎
Leverage −0.15 (0.09)
Liquidity 0.07 (0.06)
Firm Size 0.42 (0.08)⁎⁎⁎
COGS 0.04 (0.19)
Capital intensity 2.09 (0.76)⁎⁎⁎
Industry-level controls
Number of ﬁrms −0.48 (0.13)⁎⁎⁎
Industry concentration −0.83 (0.62)
Industry growth 0.25 (0.95)
Industry turbulence 1.23 (1.00)
Service industry −0.33 (0.35)
Business-to-consumer −0.41 (0.22)⁎
Exclusion restrictions
Percentage of institutional holdings 0.70 (0.29)⁎⁎
Economic growth 0.02 (0.03)
Year dummy 1: 2011 −0.05 (0.13)
Year dummy 2: 2012 −0.56 (0.17)⁎⁎⁎
Year dummy 3: 2013 −0.77 (0.21)⁎⁎⁎
Year dummy 4: 2014 −0.52 (0.19)⁎⁎⁎
Constant −3.21 (1.18)⁎⁎⁎
ρ −0.20 (0.18)
Wald Chi-Square (df) 79.46 (23)⁎⁎⁎
Maximum VIF 5.93
R2 0.15⁎⁎⁎
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Second, since the focus of this study is on the abnormal returns in the event window surrounding the PIP, the realized long-run
value of the preannounced price increase is not discernible in our ﬁndings. Following the PIP, investors' might dynamically alter
their evaluations after observing the subsequent reactions of competitors and customers. These reactions might even cause the
ﬁrm to retract the preannounced price increase. Althoughwedo take into account prior announcements of price retraction in our sen-
sitivity analyses, these announcements may act more like reputation builders for investors. Thus, more research is required to
examine the long-run effects of a PIP.
Third, even though event studies are quasi-experiments (Srinivasan & Hanssens, 2009), it is important to keep in mind that we
use cross-sectional data. As such, readers should be cautious in drawing too strong causal implications from this study.
Fourth, as this study focuses on understanding, both theoretically and empirically, investors' evaluations of PIPs, we did not elab-
orate onﬁrms'motivations formaking PIPs.More research is required to also examine the reasonswhy someﬁrms preannounce price
changes and/or provide information on the speciﬁc time to implementation and size of the price increase in the preannouncement
while others don't.
Finally, in our counterfactual analyses, we focused on four frequently occurring pricing scenarios. However, additional insights
may well be obtained by also exploring other level combinations of the focal PIP drivers.
Web Appendices
The web appendices for this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijresmar.2018.06.001.
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